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Abstract Cognitive theory has decomposed human men-
tal abilities into cognitive (sub) systems, and cognitive neu-
roscience succeeded in disclosing a host of relationships
between cognitive systems and specific structures of the
human brain. However, an explanation of why specific func-
tions are located in specific brain loci had still been missing,
along with a neurobiological model that makes concrete the
neuronal circuits that carry thoughts and meaning. Brain the-
ory, in particular the Hebb-inspired neurocybernetic propos-
als by Braitenberg, now offers an avenue toward explaining
brain–mind relationships and to spell out cognition in terms
of neuron circuits in a neuromechanistic sense. Central to this
endeavor is the theoretical construct of an elementary func-
tional neuronal unit above the level of individual neurons
and below that of whole brain areas and systems: the distrib-
uted neuronal assembly (DNA) or thought circuit (TC). It is
shown that DNA/TC theory of cognition offers an integrated
explanatory perspective on brain mechanisms of perception,
action, language, attention, memory, decision and conceptual
thought. We argue that DNAs carry all of these functions and
that their inner structure (e.g., core and halo subcomponents),
and their functional activation dynamics (e.g., ignition and
reverberation processes) answer crucial localist questions,
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such as why memory and decisions draw on prefrontal areas
although memory formation is normally driven by informa-
tion in the senses and in the motor system. We suggest that
the ability of building DNAs/TCs spread out over different
cortical areas is the key mechanism for a range of specifically
human sensorimotor, linguistic and conceptual capacities and
that the cell assembly mechanism of overlap reduction is cru-
cial for differentiating a vocabulary of actions, symbols and
concepts.
Keywords Action perception circuit · Cell assembly ·
Concept · Mirror neuron · Memory cell · Meaning · Semantic
category · Semantics
1 From cognitive psychology to cognitive neuroscience
and neurocomputation
Cognitive theory specifies the subcomponents of cogni-
tion along with their interplay. These components or cog-
nitive systems include modality-specific perception (visual,
auditory, olfactory etc.), motor movement and action, lan-
guage perception and production, attention, memory, deci-
sion, emotion, planning and conceptual thought. The separa-
tion into these systems is also manifest in the subdisciplines
of cognitive and general psychology, which are devoted to
these domains. These systems are seen as functionally inde-
pendent to a degree, although some interaction between them
is generally acknowledged. The top diagram in Fig. 1 presents
a plot of major cognitive subdomains.
Cognitive neuroscience relates these mental domains to
brain structures and led to proposals to map each of the cog-
nitive modules onto one or more brain regions. Common
localizations relate perception to sensory cortices, action con-
trol to motor systems, language comprehension to superior
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temporal and language production to inferior frontal cortex
(Geschwind 1970; Price 2012). Attention is seen as a func-
tion of dorsolateral prefrontal conjoined with dorsal pari-
etal cortex (Duncan 2006), whereas working memory may
draw upon prefrontal along with inferior temporal visual
(“visuospacial scratchpad”) or inferior parietal (“articulatory
loop”) areas (Baddeley 2003). Decisions also emerge from
prefrontal areas, where, reminiscent of a plan-generating and
decision-taking homunculus, a so-called frontal executive
has been postulated (for discussion, see Shallice 1982; Stoet
and Snyder 2009). Concepts, the hallmark of cognition and
thought, are much debated in terms of their localization in
the brain; dominant views either favor a “semantic hub”, that
is, an integration center for all kinds of meanings, or suggest









Fig. 1 Cognitive systems and their brain areas. The top panel shows a
range of cognitive capacities; some cognitive theories see these capaci-
ties as each being based on one or more specific cognitive (sub) systems,
which work, to a degree, autonomously of the others. The bottom panel
shows a tentative mapping of cognitive systems onto areas of cortex as it
has been suggested in view of evidence from experimental neuroimag-
ing and neuropsychological research. Note that several of the displayed
mappings are under discussion (see also article text). The question of
why cognitive functions are localized in one specific area (e.g. object
memory in temporal cortex)—and not in a different one (e.g. occipital
cortex)—is rarely being addressed
the brain, or both (Patterson et al. 2007; Pulvermüller 2013).
Functional specialization of brain areas and nuclei for dif-
ferent cognitive systems is evident from neuropsychological
studies looking at specific cognitive impairments in patients
with focal brain lesions and from neuroimaging experiments,
where specific combinations of areas are found active during
different cognitive tasks. The bottom panel of Fig. 1 presents
some frequently discussed brain localizations of cognitive
functions.
2 The need for explanation
Despite all the important progress achieved in understanding
aspects of cognition and in relating these aspects to specific
parts of the brain, there is one important caveat immanent
to most cognitive neuroscience research: The relationships
between cognitive modules and brain areas are observational.
An explanation is missing why cognitive process C is located
at brain locus L. In Keplerian astronomy, the trajectory of
Mars had been described precisely, but an explanation in
terms of gravitation, mass and distance was still missing. In
the same way, we can say that lesions to superior-temporal
cortex lead to deficits in using language (Geschwind 1970)
and that activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex reflects the
ability to make decisions (Heekeren et al. 2008). But we do
not yet understand why specific higher cognitive functions
are “bound” to their specific brain loci.1
A meritful neurocomputational strategy filled the boxes
of cognitive theory with artificial neuron-like elements in an
attempt to illuminate the mechanisms underlying cognitive
subprocesses carried by modules (McClelland et al. 1986;
Elman et al. 1996). This important research initiative suc-
ceeded in modeling perception and aspects of language and
concepts. However, it did not, in most cases, provide expla-
nations of why particular higher cognitive functions of the
human brain emerge in specific cortical fields. For example, a
recent simulation study of language and conceptual process-
ing built in a specific layer for semantic integration, which
was put forward as a network correlate of ventral anterior
temporal lobe, vATL;2 subsequently, the model simulations
showed that damage to this very site leads to impairments
in semantic computations performed by the model (Ueno et
al. 2011). This to a degree circular strategy cannot be said
1 It is evident that the localization of cortical motor and sensory sys-
tems is driven by efferent and afferent neuroanatomical connectivity
with effector and receptor organs. For the higher cognitive functions
including working memory, decision, attention, language and concep-
tual thought, corresponding explanations are missing.
2 The authors indeed write: “ …in order to keep an already com-
plex computational framework manageable, we implemented the vATL
semantic system alone. Specifically, it was set to generate semantic
outputs for comprehension and provided the semantic input for speak-
ing/naming” (p. 393, italics added by FP, MG & TW).
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to explain why temporal areas are so important for concep-
tual processing, because this knowledge is a priori implanted
into the model. Rather than implanting preexisting knowl-
edge about structure–function relationships into models, an
explanatory strategy may fruitfully use information from
neuroscience for deducing cortical area functions immanent
to mental activity. For example, using a network implement-
ing the general pattern of corticocortical connectivity known
from neuroanatomical investigations, predictions are possi-
ble on the brain areas showing spontaneous fluctuations of
activity that emerge when subjects rest and no cognitive activ-
ity is required (so-called resting states, see Deco et al. 2011).
In a similar way, systematic use of known facts and principles
established in cortical anatomy and physiology may guide
cognitive theorizing about the specialization of local cortical
functions. However, a full understanding why different brain
parts are active when subjects engage in different specific
cognitive tasks (see Fig. 1), why the same areas are specifi-
cally necessary for performing well on these tasks, and, more
generally, why the contributions of cortical areas are so spe-
cific, has so far not been reached. To go back to the analogy:
we know the Keplerian trajectories of the planets very well,
but we lack the Newtonian principles for understanding the
forces that keep them there.3
Our present approach will start from established neu-
roscience principles and proceed to making “predictions”
about the mechanisms of cognition.4 Knowledge and prin-
ciples revealed by neuroscience research will thus lead us
to a specification of neurobiological mechanisms of cogni-
tion in terms of neuron circuits. Immanent to this strategy
is our conviction that it is not sufficient for a biological the-
ory of cognition to address the functional levels of neurons,
brain areas and whole brains, but that an intermediate func-
tional level of neuronal assemblies is necessary—similar to
the level of words and sentences in between the levels of
sounds and whole speeches, texts or books.5 This conviction
is motivated by brain theory (Braitenberg 1978) and receives
3 McClelland et al. (1986) proposed an analogy between cognitive the-
ories and Newtonian vs. quantum field theory, making the point that
the latter may lead to more precise explanations. We believe that their
point does not apply to large parts of cognitive neuroscience, which, in
our view, are still at a preexplanatory, descriptive stage when it comes
to relating cognitive processes to brain function and structure. How-
ever, we acknowledge that neural network models have helped to better
understand the relationship between correlational information and cog-
nitive processing, which indeed implies a level of explanation.
4 Some of the “predictions” are already known to be true or false. Please
note that the aim of the neurocomputational investigations summarized
is not to recapitulate any active areas or ignition times, but rather to pro-
vide an explanatory pathway from established neuroscience knowledge
and principles to the known facts—along with those to be revealed by
future experiments.
5 This is reminiscent of Marr’s triune level theory, with
representational-and-algorithmic between functional and microstruc-
tural levels (Marr 1982). However, the cell assembly approach goes
support from neurocomputational models implementing neu-
robiologically realistic auto-associative networks that mimic
cortical structure. These networks tend to build cell assem-
blies, thus providing a brain-theoretical foundation for the
formation and existence of “micro-networks” within realistic
larger (brain, area) networks (Braitenberg and Schüz 1998;
Braitenberg 1978; Palm 1982; Heerden et al. 1970; Wennek-
ers et al. 2006; Garagnani et al. 2009b; Plenz and Thiagarajan
2007; Diesmann et al. 1999). The activation dynamics within
the micro-networks or circuits emerging in neurocomputa-
tional network simulations provide predictions on activation
dynamics in the real brain, which can either be compared
with available data or be tested in future experiments. As we
will explain, this approach leads to neuromechanistic expla-
nations of a range of cognitive functions.
3 Distributed neuronal assemblies: circuits for thought
We adopt the postulate that, in between the functional level
of the single neuron and that of whole areas, brain systems
and ultimately the whole brain, there exists a functional level
of neuronal assemblies. These assemblies are strongly con-
nected sets of neurons, which therefore each behave in a
functionally coherent manner, as a functional unit. These cell
assemblies are assumed to form the building blocks of cog-
nition. This idea has a long tradition in brain theory (Hebb
1949; Braitenberg 1978; Milner 1957; Fuster 2003, 2009;
Palm 1982; Abeles 1991; Plenz and Thiagarajan 2007; Singer
et al. 1997; Engel and Singer 2001; Harris 2005; Ponzi and
Wickens 2010; Gerstein et al. 1989). As cell assemblies may
be the neurobiological vehicles of perception, action, atten-
tion, memory, decision, concepts, language and thought, they
offer a perspective on cognitive theorizing that unites Marr’s
(computational, symbolic-algorithmic and neuronal) levels
of neurocognitive models (Marr 1982).
The cell assembly concept has been framed in different
ways. Assemblies have been proposed to be situated in a
small piece of brain or widely dispersed over distant areas of
cortex and subcortical structures. They have been framed as
functionally uniform cell conglomerates or complex circuits
producing finely tuned spatio-temporal patterns when active.
Their formation is commonly attributed to a form of Hebb-
type learning, although, in addition to truly Hebbian synaptic
strengthening by co-activation, synaptic weakening conse-
Footnote 5 continued
further than that because it unites the three levels with each other (in
the sense of Bechtel 1994; Darden and Maull 1977): a cell assembly
may be seen as a correlate of a word or syntactic rule (functional
level); it consists of neurons (micro-structure) and can be described
mathematically (algorithmically) in terms of connection probability
and structure, learning principles, functional dynamics and so on
(Wennekers et al. 2006; Gerstein et al. 1989; Harris 2005).
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quent to uncorrelated activation and mapping of temporal
patterns by spike-time-dependent plasticity are also incorpo-
rated in recent proposals. Typically, cell assemblies are con-
sidered to be the result of learning in a structured network,
whereby the structural-neuroanatomical information mani-
fest in network structure is in part genetic or epigenetic in
nature. Sensory and motor mechanisms, along with genera-
tors of internal rhythms and resultant spontaneous behaviors,
are further important factors in building cell assemblies.
What makes cell assemblies especially attractive to cog-
nitive science is the fact that they help solving a range of
problems that seem to persist for other neurocomputational
approaches. For example, concepts or percepts are some-
times represented as activation vectors over neuron popula-
tions (see, for example, Rogers and McClelland 2004), but
it is well known that this approach runs into the problem
of catastrophic overlay, making it inadequate for addressing
some relevant cognitive problems (Sougné 2001; Jackendoff
2002). For example, two or more conceptual (or perceptual)
activations would not result in both being active at the same
time, but rather in a compromise (average or sum) vector
which may be dissimilar to any of the intended represen-
tations. Sparsely coded cell assemblies with small overlap,
whose activation can co-exist within the same network, offer
a solution to this problem by allowing two or more repre-
sentations to be active at a time. Even harder to solve is the
problem of multiple instantiations, sometimes also called to
“problem of two” (Sougné 2001; Jackendoff 2002): An acti-
vation vector approach can provide a putative neural corre-
late of a concept, but, if the network were to represent two
instantiations of that concept, for example two rabbits instead
of one, the vector approach fails. In contrast, a cell assem-
bly allows for reverberatory activity to be maintained within
the circuit, but, as Abeles and colleagues showed using neu-
rocomputational simulations, such networks are not limited
to storing one instantiation. If well-timed activation waves
reverberate in the circuit and these waves progress with con-
stant speed, it is possible to store information about two or
more instantiations of a given engram (Hayon et al. 2005).
A further exciting aspect are the perspectives this approach
offers on the so-called binding problem: To store the know-
ledge that a green banana has been perceived, the cell assem-
blies for BANANA and GREEN can be coupled temporarily,
for example by synchronous oscillation of the respective neu-
ronal ensembles (Engel et al. 1992; von der Malsburg 1995;
Shastri and Ajjanagadde 1993). Furthermore, cell assembly
architectures have been argued to offer new perspectives for
brain theory, especially in the domain of modeling language
and grammar (Pulvermüller 2002; Buzsáki 2010).
As the term “cell assembly” is used in different ways by
different researchers, reflecting a degree of variability of the
CELL ASSEMBLY concept, it seems appropriate to spell
out how we use the term in the present context (see also
Braitenberg 1978; Palm 1982; Braitenberg and Schüz 1998;
Pulvermüller 2002). Cell assemblies are sets of nerve cells
that are “. . . more strongly connected to each other than to
other neurons” (Braitenberg 1978).6 The neuron members
of a cell assembly do not need to be located in a small part
of the brain, for example a hypercolumn, but can be spread
out over different cortical areas, and even involve subcor-
tical structures such as thalamus and striatum. Connections
between different parts of the cell assembly are reciprocal
in the sense that if the assembly is sliced in two parts, these
parts will be connected in both directions, from part A to
B and back (Braitenberg 1978). The strong linkage within
the cell assembly is, in part, due to preexisting connections
and, importantly, due to the correlation of activation (fir-
ing) in the past. So in this sense, the cell assembly requires
preexisting neuronanatomical connectivity and is driven by
specific correlated neuronal activity. We speak of “correla-
tion” in a lose sense, with the implication that neurons that
fire together strengthen their connections among each other
(Hebbian “fire together—wire together” rule) and that nerve
cells that fire independently of each other or even in an anti-
correlated manner reduce the strength of any links they may
have (‘Anti-Hebb’ “out of sync—delink” rule).7
These mechanisms imply that the structural properties of
cell assemblies are, in part, due to functional features of
their member neurons. In turn, the structural feature that
cell assembly neurons are relatively strongly connected with
each other has important functional implications. First, this
strong internal linkage implies that the activation dynamic of
a cell assembly is nonlinear; activation of a critical number of
assembly neurons, the activation threshold, leads to the full
activation, or ignition, of the whole circuit, including (not
necessarily all but) most of its members. Second, after an
ignition, and even if only subliminal (below threshold) acti-
vation is present in the circuit, such activity will be retained or
“held” for some time, due to reverberation of activity, leading
to hysteresis-like dynamics. Third, ignition-related explosive
activation in networks requires mechanisms for activity regu-
lation to prevent full activation of the entire network—which
is reminiscent of epileptic seizures in real brains. Regula-
tion processes are available in cortex, in the local interac-
tion between excitatory neurons and their inhibitory local
neighbors and in the area-specific interplay between cortex
and subcortical structures. Such feedback regulation can be
implemented as control mechanism with specific gain, which
controls the “activation threshold” of excitatory neurons (and
cell assemblies) in specific cortical areas (Braitenberg 1978;
6 In neurocomputational and experimental work, it may be useful to use
a more precise mathematical definition (see, for example, Garagnani et
al. 2009b).
7 For a discussion of mathematically precise formulations of relevant
learning rules, see Garagnani et al. 2009b.
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Elbert and Rockstroh 1987; Knoblauch and Palm 2002; Wen-
nekers et al. 2006). Whereas reverberation may be possible
in several cell assemblies at a time (with even more than one
reverberation waves being present in a given assembly), the
massive activation process of ignition implies that a substan-
tial amount of inhibition is created, so that two cell assemblies
that contain neurons located in the same cortical area would
interfere with each other functionally, leading to mutual com-
petition between ignition processes. The degree of competi-
tion is determined by the gain of the regulation mechanisms.
Cell assemblies in this sense imply sparse coding, that is,
that, within the greater network of the cortex of the entire
brain, the nerve cells that are part of, and thus significantly
contribute to, one specific cell assembly represent a small
minority. Estimates of cell assembly size range between hun-
dreds and ca. 100.000 neurons, whereas the cortex contains
more than 1010 (for discussion, see Palm 1993, 1990). A fur-
ther feature that makes cell assemblies attractive to cognitive
theory is the fact that they can overlap and be structured hier-
archically. This means that two cell assemblies can be neuron
sets that intersect and that one cell assembly can contain the
other, thereby providing putative mechanisms for relation-
ships between concepts and meanings (Pulvermüller 2002;
Wennekers 2009).
We will also use the words “distributed neuronal assem-
bly (DNA)” or “thought circuit (TC)” when speaking about
cell assemblies in the sense explained in this section. In the
next paragraphs, we will now outline a model of DNA/TCs,
highlighting both cell assembly mechanisms and their role
as carriers of cognition.
4 Action and perception
Sensory stimulation causes activity in primary sensory fields
from where activity propagates to secondary modality-
preferential and higher multimodal areas. Given a reasonably
high signal-to-noise ratio, a repeated sensory event there-
fore activates similar populations of sensory cortical neu-
rons repeatedly and the frequently co-activated neurons may
therefore strengthen their mutual connections and merge into
a circuit. The perception and recognition of objects known
from sensory experience may be based on the ignition of such
sensory cell assemblies. Neurocomputational work imple-
menting established neuroscience principles has shown that
repeated local firing gives rise to local cortical circuits includ-
ing many neurons (Doursat and Bienenstock 2006).
In contrast to local and purely uni-modal sensory acti-
vation, motor movements and actions are always charac-
terized by both sensory and motor information. As actions
are brought about by neuronal activity in the motor cortex
and adjacent premotor and prefrontal areas, repeating simi-
lar movements will therefore lead to the formation of motor
circuits. However, as self-produced movements imply per-
ception of aspects of these actions, motor circuits normally
do not stand alone. Given there is concordant auditory, visual
and somatosensory input—for example when hearing and
feeling oneself articulate the syllable “ba”, or when feeling,
seeing and hearing the hammer in one’s hand strike—there
is correlated activity in different motor, sensory and multi-
modal brain areas (Braitenberg and Pulvermüller 1992; Pul-
vermüller 1999). Given there are sufficiently rich long-range
cortico-cortical connections between these areas, the corre-
lated multisite activation pattern leads to the formation of
widely distributed neuronal assemblies that bind motor and
sensory aspects of a specific action. These action percep-
tion circuits (Pulvermüller and Fadiga 2010) are a special
type of cell assembly in that they include neurons in differ-
ent areas distant from each other (e.g., auditory and motor
cortex) and exhibit a specific distribution over the cortex that
reflects, to a degree, the sensory and motor type of informa-
tion stored (e.g., articulatory and auditory, but not hand motor
and visual,8 in the case of articulations, vice versa in the case
of hand waving). As motor neurons are included in these
action perception circuits, performance of specific motor
commands and muscle contractions can be brought about by
their ignition, and, as specific sensory cells are also included,
the perception of sensory aspects leading to the recognition
of the same type of action performed by others is equally
based on the ignition of the same action perception circuits.
Action perception circuits conceived as distributed neu-
ronal assemblies establish a functional link between specific
sets of sensory and motor information. As such, they provide
a mechanism for what Braitenberg and Schüz consider the
primary function of the neocortex, namely information mix-
ing, that is, the joining together of information across modal-
ities (Braitenberg and Schüz 1998), which may be especially
important for language processing (Braitenberg and Pulver-
müller 1992; Braitenberg and Schüz 1992). As information
about an action and its corresponding perceptions are joined
together in an action-specific manner, action perception cir-
cuits also provide a mechanism and explanation for mirror
neurons. Mirror neurons are cells in the premotor and infe-
rior parietal cortex that respond both during performance and
during perception of one type of action (for example grasp-
ing, Kohler et al. 2002; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). In
the articulatory motor system, mirror activity has also been
reported for specific speech sound types (Fadiga et al. 2002;
Watkins et al. 2003; Pulvermüller et al. 2006). The corre-
lation learning principle together with the known cortico-
cortical connectivity between relevant sensorimotor areas of
cortex provides an explanation why action perception cir-
8 Please note that, although syllable articulation misses any visual
aspects, correlations between speech and visual information about
mouth movements can be mapped when observing others.
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cuits emerge and, thus, why mirror neurons exist. In neuro-
computational studies, mirror neuron activity could indeed
be shown as a consequence of Hebbian-associative learning
between actions and corresponding perceptions (Garagnani
et al. 2007; Hanuschkin et al. 2013). Furthermore, recent
experiments in humans showed that mirror activity is indeed
tied to aspects of action perception learning and therefore
substantially strengthens this position (Pulvermüller et al.
2012; Giudice et al. 2009; Engel et al. 2012). It might there-
fore seem appropriate to consider mirror mechanisms not as
fundamental, but, instead, as a consequence of the more basic
neuroscience principle of correlation learning and of corti-
cal connectivity. We note, however, that for mirror activity
already observable very early in life (Lepage and Theoret
2007; Yeung and Werker 2013), further research is neces-
sary to address the question whether correlation learning
might have contributed also in these cases and to what degree
genetic or epigenetic mechanisms are necessary to bring
it about. Crucially, information mixing and mirror neuron
activity cannot be explained by associative learning alone (cf.
Heyes 2010), but requires preset specific cortico-cortical con-
nectivity between relevant sensory and motor areas, which
provide the substrate for such mirror learning. This point
will be of special relevance in the language section below
where a connectivity difference between macaca and human
is related to vocabulary learning ability.
For determining the cortical distribution of DNAs, both
functional neuroscience principles (correlation learning) and
structural knowledge about specific neuroanatomical con-
nectivity are equally relevant. The neuroanatomical connec-
tions between primary sensory and motor cortices are not
direct in most cases. With the exception of the link between
primary motor and somatosensory cortex, which lie side by
side and are directly linked, connections between primary
areas are indirect, traveling through adjacent “secondary”
modality-preferential cortices and further multimodal sites
adjacent to these (Fig. 2, middle panel). This connection
structure implies that action perception circuits incorporate
neurons in all of these “switch over” regions through which
sensorimotor activation waves must travel to make contact
with each other. In a model of action perception learning
that incorporates correlation learning mechanisms and infor-
mation about neuroanatomical connectivity, cell assembly
formation was found as a result of co-activation of neural
elements in primary motor and sensory “areas” of the net-
work (Fig. 2, bottom panel, Garagnani et al. 2007, 2008,
2009b). The learning of correlations between articulatory
movements and auditory input patterns—as it is present when
infants “babble” and use their first words (Locke 1993)—led
to cell assemblies distributed over the model correlates of
inferior prefrontal, premotor and primary motor cortex in
inferior frontal cortex as well as primary auditory, auditory
belt and parabelt areas in superior temporal cortex. Likewise,
learning the co-occurrence of hand movements and specific
object shapes and colors was manifest in cell assembly for-
mation across primary and inferior temporal visual process-
ing areas along with dorsolateral prefrontal, premotor and
motor cortex (Garagnani et al. 2007, 2009b; Garagnani and
Pulvermüller 2013). Contrary to the intuition that it might be
difficult to separate and specifically activate cell assemblies
(Milner 1996), correlated sensorimotor patterns repeatedly
presented to networks with neuroanatomically inspired area
structure and sparse random connectivity led to cell assem-
blies with small overlap that could be defined using robust cri-
teria related to activation dynamics (Garagnani et al. 2009b).9
At the cognitive psychological level, the ignition of a cell
assembly provides a mechanism for the recognition of a
familiar stimulus that matches a cortical representation. It
also provides a mechanism for the recognition of familiar
stimuli based on insufficient information—for example an
object partly hidden behind a different one or an incomplete
spoken word. Note that spoken words are normally being
recognized before they end; even if alternative word candi-
dates match a given input fragment, the more frequent item
may indeed be preferred in the absence of unambiguous evi-
dence (Marslen-Wilson 1990). The role of frequency as a
facilitatory factor in the recognition process is explained by
the Hebbian learning mechanisms and the resultant stronger
links and more robust activation dynamics of the more fre-
quently activated DNA/TCs.
5 Memory
Cell assemblies are structured internally. Contrary to the sug-
gestion that such circuits are just an amorphous agglutination
of neural elements, it has been argued that they can be sep-
arated into a most strongly connected core or kernel part
and a periphery or halo (Braitenberg 1978). In the ignition
process, the entire cell assembly becomes active, including
core and halo parts, whereas the most strongly connected
core will naturally form the basis for reverberant activity.
Whereas ignition processes provide the mechanism for the
recognition of a familiar stimulus, the sustained reverberation
of activity represents a mechanism for maintaining informa-
tion active in memory, so-called active or working memory
(Fuster 1995; Zipser et al. 1993).
Crucially, there are riddles surrounding the brain organi-
zation of perception, motor and memory processes that have
not been solved in spite of efforts in current neuroscience
and cognitive research. Perception, action and memory tend
to dissociate. It has been suggested that “object knowledge
9 For an overview of related neurocomputational work on cell assem-
blies, see, for example, (Huyck and Passmore 2013; Wennekers et al.
2006; Palm 1982).
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circuit core crucial for working memory
correlated sensorimotor activation







Fig. 2 Mechanisms of the formation of action perception circuits, that
is, distributed cell assemblies (DNAs) interlinking information about
actions and concordant perceptions. The top panel on the left shows
areas involved when mapping the articulatory motor schema of a spo-
ken word and the sounds brought about by such an articulation: pri-
mary motor (M1), premotor (PM), prefrontal (PF), auditory parabelt
(PB), auditory belt (AB) and primary auditory (A1) cortex. The top
right panel shows areas relevant for mapping finger movements to
visual stimuli: apart from more dorsal frontal areas, anterior tempo-
ral (AT), temporooccipital (TO) and primary visual cortex (V1). The
middle panel shows the connection structure of these areas, which is
similar for the auditory-articulatory and visuomotor domains. Middle
panel: Functionally, correlated activity in primary areas drives forma-
tion of action perception circuits but core parts of these cell assemblies
develop in higher (PF, PB, AT) areas because of corticocortical connec-
tion structure. Core parts are most important for memory and decisions.
The bottom panel illustrates the distributed character of the cell assem-
blies, which interlink neurons in all relevant areas but still function as
one closed information processing device and representational unit
is stored as a distributed network of cortical regions and
that the organization of these regions may closely parallel
the organization of sensory, and perhaps also motor, sys-
tems in the human brain” (Martin et al. 1995). In contrast to
such an “embodied” sensorimotor view on knowledge and
memory, it is well known that memory storage of specific
123
580 Biol Cybern (2014) 108:573–593
sensorimotor knowledge most typically and most strongly
engages the dorsolateral prefrontal, anterior temporal and
other higher multimodal cortices. These areas are not part
of dedicated sensory or motor systems, but rather repre-
sent multimodal cortices. The suggestions that “embodied”
action- and perception-related information in sensorimotor
cortices drives the formation of cortical cell assemblies there-
fore seem in contrast to the observations from neurophysio-
logical research on working memory: The most substantial
and sustained reverberating memory activity is known to be
present in multimodal areas such as dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and anterior temporal lobe, where cortical cooling
also impairs memory specifically (Fuster 1995). Therefore,
motor and sensory processes and memory dissociate from
each other at the neurofunctional level and a neurocognitive
theory need to explain why this is so.
Such an explanation is possible based on the distinction
between kernel and halo of cell assemblies, along with infor-
mation about corticocortical connectivity (Pulvermüller and
Garagnani 2014). Most neurons included in the core part of
the cell assembly that is most relevant for maintaining rever-
beration, and therefore for working memory, are located in
those brain areas between which the most elaborate con-
nectivity is present. Comparing the connectivity structures
interlinking the modality-preferential primary and secondary
areas and the multimodal convergence areas, it appears that
the latter show the largest number of cross-area links (for
discussion of neuroanatomical evidence, see Garagnani and
Pulvermüller 2013). For this reason, they provide the sub-
strate for (most of) the most strongly interlinked assembly
cells and hence for building cell assembly cores.10 Therefore,
the core part carrying reverberant active memory processes
is in association with cortices and thus outside both sensory
and motor regions. Due to specific auditory-motor and visual-
motor connectivity pathways, verbal memory processes pri-
marily draw on superior temporal/temporoparietal auditory
and inferior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Contrasting with
the relevance of multimodal areas for working memory,
motor regions are most crucial for acting—as their damage
not only partly lesions the cell assembly but, in addition, dis-
connects it from its motor output—and sensory regions are
most crucial for perception—as their damage disconnects it
from sensory information input. Model simulations confirm
that prefrontal and anterior temporal cortex are among the
prime sites for working memory (Pulvermüller and Garag-
nani 2014; Garagnani and Pulvermüller 2013). The middle
part of Fig. 2 illustrates the relationship between cortical
areas, connection structure, learning driven by sensorimotor
10 Neurons strongly linked into the assembly can also form outside
areas strongly connected with each other, but this is less likely. So
the lion’s share of the core part of cell assemblies emerges within the
strongly interlinked multimodal areas.
correlation and resultant memory mechanisms, using spo-
ken words as an example.11 Crucially, the inner structure of
DNAs can offer an explanation why the “higher” multimodal
areas are so important for memory, whereas the formation of
memory circuits is driven by information in the senses and
the motor system.
6 Decisions
From a cell assembly perspective, decisions and memory
appear to be based on similar mechanisms. Reverberant
memory activity lasts longest in the core part of the circuit,
which exhibits the strongest average connection strength.
Such high connection strength may also provide a mecha-
nism for new activity spontaneously emerging in a circuit.
Such spontaneous activation should therefore start in the cir-
cuit’s core. One reason for this local specificity lies in the
fact that uncorrelated background noise activity is always
present in real networks of neurons and such activity will
accumulate and reverberate more efficiently in cells with
multiple inputs from other noise-emitting neurons compared
with less strongly interlinked ones. When first implementing
networks fashioned according to cortical anatomy that gave
rise to action perception circuits, we immediately observed
that networks with low levels of random activity (white noise)
present in all of their parts rarely stayed inactive, but that,
instead, spontaneous ignitions emerged within them, without
any sensory stimulation being present (see also, for example,
Willwacher 1976). Such spontaneous emergence of activity
in specific DNA/TCs can be seen as a putative brain mecha-
nism of an emerging thought or intention to act—when activ-
ity in the cell assembly first appears, followed by a decision
to prefer a specific action over alternatives—when the cell
assembly’s activity level is substantially higher than that of its
competitors, finally culminating in performance of the action
itself—when the cell assembly fully ignites and activates its
motor output. The level of activity in the cell assembly would
thus represent the “stage” of an intention/decision, and the
specific action perception circuit activated and its cortical dis-
tribution contain the information about the “content” of the
action or perceptual decision. A range of previous research
addressed the neurocomputational basis of decisions (Deco
et al. 2013).
One crucial question in the emergence of decisions to act
is about where such decisions come from. Why would the
neuronal correlates of intentions and decisions to act be first
manifest in specific cortical areas? In networks containing
11 A recent network model simulated a range of temporal features of
activation dynamics in an associative circuit model of different cortical
areas (Verduzco-Flores et al. 2009). However, this work did not aim
at explaining why specific parts of the architecture showed memory
activity in the first place.
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action perception circuits of the structure outlined in Fig. 2,
spontaneous ignitions start in multimodal prefrontal and tem-
poral areas, where activation slopes also rise most sharply
toward full ignition (Garagnani and Pulvermüller 2013). The
explanation of this local specificity of decision emergence
can be based on background activity in the network—due to
noise and previous specific activations—which accumulates
most efficiently in DNA cores. Core neurons receive multi-
ple inputs from other cell assembly neurons, more than nerve
cells in the halo, which are more weakly interlinked. These
multiple inputs make them most likely candidates for accu-
mulating substantial activation if all neurons are equally sub-
ject to noncorrelated spontaneous activity (“noise”, Garag-
nani and Pulvermüller 2013). Activity accumulation in most
strongly connected circuit parts also applies if specific infor-
mative input reaches a given circuit by way of corticocortical
input, for example via connections from specific other DNAs.
Therefore, activity accumulation in cores explains why and
how spontaneous ignition of DNAs comes about and thus
provides a candidate mechanism for the emergence of inten-
tions and decisions to act. In this model, the factors influenc-
ing the model’s “free” decisions (the choice of one circuit
over others in the spontaneous ignition process) include the
accumulation of “noise” in circuits, runaway activation from
previous circuit activations, specific between circuit connec-
tions and the inner connection strength and coherence of the
igniting circuit itself.
Looking back at previous paragraphs, it appears that the
cell assembly model implies that the neurons in the core part
of DNAs, most of which are localized in higher multimodal
cortices, are the primary substrate of a range of higher sophis-
ticated cognitive mechanisms. The present section made this
point for intentions and decisions and the previous one for
working memory. The same cortical substrate forms the basis
of working memory and for intentions/decisions, although
the cortical distribution of the circuit over specific areas may
differ between stimulus types, for example between words
and objects. The observation that similar parts of prefrontal
cortex are active in standard working memory and percep-
tual decision tasks sits well with these postulates (Duncan
and Owen 2000; Fuster 2008, 2009; Heekeren et al. 2008).
It thus appears that the question why a wide range of higher
cognitive processes are carried by the same “multi demand
system,” and why this network draws, especially upon pre-
frontal cortex (Duncan 2010), can, in part, be answered and
explained by cell assembly theory.
7 Attention
As brain-like architectures are in danger of catastrophic over-
activation, activation regulation processes are required (see
section on DNAs above, Braitenberg 1978; Milner 1996;
Braitenberg and Schüz 1998). In a similar fashion, lack of
regulation and control processes makes it possible that activ-
ity extinguishes within a network. Braitenberg’s proposal of
regulating the firing threshold of neurons effective in cor-
tex generally or in an area-specific manner (see Fig. 3, top
panel, Braitenberg 1978) addresses both the over- and under-
activation problems and was successfully applied to neuro-
computation models, where it contributes to the functional-
ity of networks including cell assemblies (see, for example,
Elbert and Rockstroh 1987; Knoblauch and Palm 2002; Wen-
nekers et al. 2006; Bienenstock 1994). Threshold regulation
can be implemented as a mechanism that provides a degree
of background activity to excitatory neurons in a given area;
the regulatory input is calculated as a function of previous
activity of the same network part. The neuronal substrate for
this feedback regulation mechanism may be provided by one
of the big loops of neuroanatomical structures in which the
neocortex is embedded, for example the striato-thalamic or
the hippocampal loop (Braitenberg 1984; Fuster 1995; Miller
1991; Miller and Wickens 1991). A regulatory loop allows for
modifying the gain or amplification factor of the regulation
function, which influences the speed and power of regulation.
A range of recent neurocomputational simulations success-
fully used background activity (noise) to prevent extinguish-
ing of network activity together with area-specific inhibitory
feedback regulation to prevent several ignitions at a time and
to control the degree of competition between partly active
reverberating cell assemblies (Bibbig et al. 1995; Palm and
Sommer 1995; Knoblauch and Palm 2001; Wennekers et al.
2006; Garagnani et al. 2008).
At the cognitive level, the degree of inhibition in a neural
and cognitive system has been related to attention. According
to the well-established biased competition model (Duncan
2006), attention to objects or loci in space is controlled by
two main factors, the degree to which there is a bias toward
them and the degree to which different putative targets of
cognitive processing compete with each other. In cell assem-
bly networks, the degree of preactivation or priming of a
circuit (that is, its level of preexisting activity) provides the
neuromechanistic correlate for the bias and the degree of reg-
ulatory inhibition (or threshold regulation) underpins com-
petition (for discussion, see Garagnani et al. 2008).
Adopting these neurocognitive mechanisms for attention,
different levels of attention can be simulated in brain-like
neurocomputational networks by choosing different levels of
regulatory inhibition. These different regulation levels pro-
vide different levels of inhibition between DNAs; in addi-
tion, threshold regulation can be chosen so that it guaran-
tees that, within given areas, only one circuit ignites at a
time and that each ignition is followed by strong global inhi-
bition (see Section on DNAs). Now, the level of attention
can be adjusted by altering regulation gains. High atten-
tion and availability of ample attentional resources can be
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implemented by low degrees of regulation and inhibition.
With low inhibition/high attention, several cell assemblies
can simultaneously become partly active. (Note that, for guar-
anteeing functionality of the cell assembly network, it may
still be advantageous to keep inhibition constants within a
range preventing more than one ignition at a time within a
given area.) This corresponds to the situation when an incom-
plete word (such as “wai…”) is perceived and several lexical
alternatives from its “cohort” are partly activated (“wait”,
“wail”, “waif” etc., see Marslen-Wilson 1987). Therefore,
with high attention, ample availability of “cognitive process-
ing resources” and thus weak inhibition in the network, the
alternative lexical circuits can co-activate and each create
some substantial activity. In contrast, under low-attention
conditions, when cognitive processing resources are very
limited, and therefore, strong inhibition is present in the net-
work, the competing cell assemblies would only be allowed
a much reduced activation level (i.e., the input “wai” may
only minimally activate some members of its cohort). In
contrast to these strongly attention-dependent processes for
meaningless unfamiliar stimuli (pseudowords) or ambigu-
ous word fragments, the presentation of a meaningful word
leads to the ignition of its corresponding stored cell assembly
which, regardless of attention level, leads to the suppression
of competitor circuits. In this case, a modulation of the gain
of feedback regulation would have a minor effect on cortical
activation dynamics because it is dominated by the ignition
process, which takes place in spite of threshold regulation.
These predictions were supported by neurocomputational
simulations using a model of the language cortex with noise
background activity and attention modulation implemented
in the gain of area-specific inhibitory regulation processes.
Word patterns, which had previously been learned by the net-
work, resulting in word-specific action perception circuits,
indeed led to network activation, which was only modulated
to a small degree by the level of feedback inhibition and
attention. However, pseudoword stimuli, which had not been
learned previously thus lacking corresponding cell assem-
blies, led to simultaneous partial activation of word circuits,
which massively varied with the level of the gain and thus
attention (Garagnani et al. 2008). Critically, the same dif-
ferential pattern of attention effects on word and pseudo-
word processing was found in novel experiments performed
with human subjects and recordings of EEG and MEG
responses. These results provide strong support for the
model’s predictions (Fig. 3, middle panel, Shtyrov et al. 2010;
Garagnani et al. 2009a).
The attention model of cell assembly competition makes
one further critical prediction: attention should not have
one single general brain manifestation and locus but should
instead always occur within the range of cortical areas
where competing cell assemblies are located. In the case of
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Fig. 3 Mechanisms of attention. Top panel: Illustration of Braiten-
berg’s proposal of a threshold regulation mechanism, which controls
activation levels in the brain or, as suggested here, in each cortical area
specifically, and provides a neuronal basis for attention and task adjust-
ment. A cybernetic feedback regulation loop controls activation in a
given brain area by comparing it with a target value and feeding back
a control value that depends on the discrepancy between target and
actual activity (Braitenberg 1978). Middle panel: Attention effects on
language processing as predicted by a model including threshold control
and as measured experimentally. Brain responses (recorded with MEG,
on the left) and brain model responses (insets on the right) to familiar
words (in red) and unfamiliar pseudowords (in blue) when attention is
directed toward these stimuli (solid lines/inset on the upper right) or
away from them (broken lines/inset on the lower right). Note the great
attention-related variability of responses to pseudowords and the much
reduced attention effect to words (adopted from Garagnani et al. 2008,
2009a). Bottom panels: The significant interaction of lexicality (words
vs. pseudowords) and attention is illustrated in the bar plot on the left
(Garagnani et al. 2009a). The strongest cortical sources underlying the
attention effects for both words and pseudowords are present in left
inferior frontal cortex (Shtyrov et al. 2010)
cortex along with lateral parietal areas. However, in the case
of spoken language, these are the multimodal areas in the
perisylvian cortices including inferior frontal, inferior pari-
etal and superior temporal subregions. Model simulations
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further indicate that in case of sensory simulation of cell
assemblies that link action and perception information, atten-
tion effects are most pronounced in their frontal, action-
related network parts. This explains why attention effects
in spoken language processing are most clearly manifest in
Broca’s region in left inferior frontal cortex and not in dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3, Shtyrov et al. 2010), and
why lexical competition effects are manifest in this area as
well (Thompson-Schill et al. 2005).
8 Language
Language can be seen as a huge set of meaningful elements
(usually tens to hundreds of thousands) that can be com-
bined to yield even larger sets of constructions. Each con-
struction can be used to perform specific communicative
actions, which follow each other according to further com-
binatorial schemas. The purpose and intention related to a
communicative action is intrinsically related to the typical
sequence schemas it is part of. For example, a request is
characterized by the desire or intention to obtain something,
which is also manifest in the typical sequence that a request
is frequently followed—not always of course—by the action
of transferring the requested entity to the requesting party.
Therefore, combinatorial mechanisms for language need to
be implemented at different levels, at the level of sounds
following each other in words, at that of morphemes and
words connected in sentences and texts and at the level of
social-communicative actions interlinked with each other by
pragmatic rules and hierarchical action schemas.
In the cell assembly framework, the phonological sequen-
ces according to which speech sounds are lined up in words
can be implemented by synfire chains—parallel and pre-
cisely timed neuron chains contained in cell assemblies
(Abeles 1991; Braitenberg and Pulvermüller 1992). Note
that explicit modeling of such spatiotemporal patterns these
chains generate is challenging and explicit neurocompu-
tational work using realistic circuit architectures incorpo-
rating major aspects of the anatomy of the language cor-
tex are still missing; such models, which may build on
established computational work on synfire chains (Dies-
mann et al. 1999; Hayon et al. 2005; Verduzco-Flores et
al. 2012), represent an important target for future research.
Syntactic combination can be implemented neuromechanis-
tically by direct and indirect links between cell assemblies
along with activation dynamics present within memory-
active cell assemblies (Pulvermüller and Garagnani 2014;
Pulvermüller 2010; Buzsáki 2010). For example, indirect
between-assembly links by way of additional combinator-
ial neuronal assemblies may interconnect groups of lexical
circuits—corresponding, for example, to the combinatorial
relationship between syntactic–semantic categories of nouns
and verbs (Pulvermüller and Knoblauch 2009; Humble et al.
2012). Likewise, combinatorial relationships between com-
municative actions can be implemented by sequential and
hierarchical links between cell assemblies backing social-
communicative actions (Egorova et al. 2013; Pulvermüller
et al. 2014). Recursion, the repeated application of a com-
binatorial schema at the level of word or communicative
action sequences, may require multiple cell assembly acti-
vation along with storage of the temporal relationship of
their activation times, which, arguably, may draw upon the
effect that, after an ignition, activation levels fall off monoto-
nously for some time so that the sequence of activations
can be stored in activation hierarchies (Pulvermüller 1993;
Buzsáki 2010). Using the neurobiological mechanisms for
recursion and embedding summarized here, abstract linguis-
tic grammars can be rewritten in terms of algorithms denoting
cell assembly architectures and their dynamics (Pulvermüller
2002; Wennekers and Palm 2009).
Although in linguistics the combinatorial properties of
language are usually emphasized as the most important
aspect of human language, the sheer quantity of words
and stored meaningful forms immanent to human languages
already sets them apart from all known animal communi-
cation systems. A neurobiological correlate for such huge
vocabularies seems obvious (see also section on action and
perception): The left perisylvian cortex, where correlated
motor and sensory activity are present during articulation
of words, is more strongly connected by way of dorsal long-
distance connections through the arcuate fascicle in humans
compared with nonhuman monkeys, and it tends to be more
strongly developed in the left hemisphere than in the right
(Rilling et al. 2008; Catani et al. 2005; Dubois et al. 2009;
Buchel et al. 2004). Building a huge vocabulary may criti-
cally depend on the availability of rich frontotemporal con-
nectivity (although such connectivity is likely not sufficient,
see below). If so, the following critical experimental pre-
dictions result: Listening to unfamiliar novel words may
only activate auditory cortex, and perceptual learning of such
word forms may not change this. However, active repetition
of novel word forms by the learner leads to frontotemporal
correlation of neuronal activity, which is mapped most effi-
ciently in the left hemisphere of most individuals because
of the predominance of frontotemporal connections there.
Therefore, left lateralized perisylvian cell assemblies develop
as a consequence of articulatory learning of novel word learn-
ing by repetition. These cell assemblies should include left
inferior frontal neuron sets.
Experimental study of word learning indeed showed left
lateralized inferior frontal activation during passive listening
to novel word forms after articulatory but not after perceptual
learning. These results support a link between vocabulary
build-up and action perception circuit formation by way of
human-specific left lateralized frontotemporal connections.
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The cell assembly perspective suggests that establishing the
rich cortico-cortical connections in left perisylvian cortex
was humans’ key step to language. Although rich connections
in themselves cannot explain huge vocabularies, they may
still represent a necessary feature of such an explanation.
Direct connections between word-related circuits cannot
explain why combinatorial principles apply to large word
classes and sometimes lead to the production of construc-
tions the speaker has not encountered before. This phenom-
enon of generalization—together with that of recursion—led
linguists to argue that much grammatical knowledge must
be immanent to the genetic code. Further explanation would
therefore not be necessary. However, there is information
in the recombination structure of words in sentences. For
example, subject nouns tend to co-occur with predicate verbs,
determiners with nouns and adjectives with nouns. A word
group A may form, because its members a1, a2, . . . , am tend
to co-occur with members b1, b2, . . . , bm of word group B.
It would not be economic to assume that the species stores
information in the genetic code the individual can get for free
by mapping correlations in the input.
The nervous systems of various animals, from insect to
mammal, house vast numbers of neurons that are sensi-
tive to the direction of a visually perceived movement, and
the mechanism behind this direction sensitivity includes the
detection of the order of the activations of neurons, that is,
sequence detection (Hubel 1995; Reichardt and Varju 1959;
Barlow and Levick 1965). It does not appear as a particularly
strong assumption that the human brain can do with words
what a vast range of nervous systems can do with visual
stimuli: to detect in which order they appear. In this sense,
there may be neuronal elements that respond specifically to
sequences made up of two words. For the sequence of word-
ai-followed-by-word-bj, there would be a sequence detector
SDij responding specifically to this sequence of ignitions.
If sequence ai-followed-by-bj appears, there is strengthen-
ing of connections between the circuits for words ai and
bj by way of the SDij circuit.12 Suppose the words ai and
bj have each already appeared in several different contexts
12 There could be strong direct links between all word representations
but the anatomy of the cortex speaks against this possibility. Assum-
ing probabilistic connectivity, one word-related DNA of 1,000 neu-
rons (see, for example, Palm 1993), with 10,000 synapses per neu-
ron, could reach a maximum of 107 other neurons. The human cor-
tex includes about 1.5 ∗ 1010 neurons (Haug 1987), ca. 1/10 of which
are in the perisylvian language cortex (i.e., some 1.5 ∗ 109 neurons
overall). As a maximum of 107 neurons can be reached by way of
a monosynaptic link from one DNA, a second DNA of 1,000 neu-
rons in perisylvian cortex would only receive ca. 7 inputs (more likely
even less, as some of the projections reach extrasylvian neurons) in
the average, which is probably not enough to bring about a lasting
functional change or ignition in the second DNA. With two synap-
tic steps, most (or even all) of the neurons in perisylvian cortex can
be reached, and after strengthening of connections, these can become
effective. This argument provides a rational for the assumption that
before and therefore their cell assemblies acquired strong
connections to a range of other SDs; in this case, a new word
sequence will co-activate its specific SD together with the
other SDs strongly linked with the cell assemblies of ai and
bj. Thus, a number of SDs will be co-activated and, assuming
there is auto-associative connectivity within the SD network,
bound together by way of neuronal learning mechanisms. We
have previously shown that such interlinking of co-activated
SD circuits provides a mechanism for combinatorial general-
ization (Pulvermüller and Knoblauch 2009; Knoblauch and
Pulvermüller 2005). The combinatorial neuronal assemblies,
which function as discrete elements that ignite and rever-
berate, link together word groups that need to be defined at
both the lexical and semantic levels, such as animal nouns
and action-related verbs. Crucially, the discrete combinator-
ial neuronal assemblies provide a mechanistic explanation for
combinatorial generalization (as illustrated in Fig. 4). Such
generalized combinatorial learning can be effective at the
level of individual word forms, and at that of larger construc-
tions and social-communicative action schemas (speech acts)
as well.
We submit that cell assemblies may help explain why
and how combinatorial learning comes about. Links within
and between cell assemblies may be essential for combina-
torial mechanisms at the linguistic levels of speech sound
sequences, word combinations and hierarchies in construc-
tions, and social-communicative action schemas.
9 Concepts and meaning
Where does the brain store and process meaning? Figure 1
(bottom panel) graphically summarizes one popular answer
to this question that concepts are placed in the “semantic
hub” in ventral anterior temporal lobe (Patterson et al. 2007).
However, this and similar statements actually obscure the
fact that there is, in fact, a wide variety of opinions. Different
researchers postulate semantic-conceptual centers, seman-
tic binding sites or “hubs” in inferior prefrontal (anterior
area of Broca and next to it) (Bookheimer 2002), inferior
parietal (angular gyrus) (Binder and Desai 2011), superior
temporal (Hillis et al. 2001), temporopolar (Patterson et al.
2007) and/or inferior to middle posterior-temporal (Hickok
and Poeppel 2007) cortex (see Fig. 5, left panel, and, for
review, Pulvermüller 2013). The wide distribution of these
areas is consistent with the idea that, in order to represent con-
cepts, information from many senses must be made available
and be integrated with each other (Lichtheim 1885; Wernicke
1874).
Footnote 12 continued
grammatical sequence detection is based on indirect links between
word-related cell assemblies (for discussion of this neuroanatomical
argument, see Pulvermüller 2002; Pulvermüller and Knoblauch 2009).
123























































372 372 372 372 372 166 166 166 166 166
384 384 384 384 384 166 166 166 166 166
380 380 380 380 380 166 166 166 166 166
357 357 357 357 357 166 166 166 166 166
353 353 353 353 353 166 166 166 166 166
166 166 166 166 166 334 166 166 166 166
166 166 166 166 166 166 337 166 166 166
166 166 166 166 166 166 166 341 166 166
166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 345 166




























Hahn x x x
Esel x x x x








Corpus data: co-occurrence of
nouns (left) and verbs (top) 
Network structure: links between
DNAs (grey) and  SDs (black/white)
Network function: verb
priming by noun input 
Fig. 4 Combinatorial learning of noun-verb co-occurrences in an auto-
associative neuronal network model. Left panel: The matrix shows word
pair co-occurrences in a mini-corpus that served as input to the network
(verbs in top row, nouns in left column; crosses indicate co-occurrences
in text). The matrix section of frequent recombination is highlighted in
yellow. Middle panel: Neuronal elements, DNAs, for the same words
(grey circles), sequence detectors, SDs, sensitive to specific word pair
sequences (white and black circles in square arrangement), and connec-
tions between them. Black SDs indicate learning of specific sequences
of nouns and verbs previously presented to the network. Note that the
DNAs of all words previously involved in combinatorial exchanges
are interlinked by way of a conglomerate of heavily interconnected
sequence detectors, the combinatorial neuronal assembly (black SDs
and black between-SD links on top left). Formation of general links
between those nouns and verbs, which frequently occur in combination
with the respective other word group (yellow square), by formation
of the combinatorial neuronal assembly is a neuromechanistic result
of co-activation of some (not all) of the relevant SDs. Right panel:
Result of combinatorial learning for network functionality. After learn-
ing, activation of any noun involved in the combinatorial schema (yellow
square) primes all of the verbs involved to the same degree, regardless
of whether the specific word sequence itself had been subject to learn-
ing. The dynamics are discrete in the sense of an all-or-none response.
Note the generalization to not previously encountered sequences. Lexi-
cal items not participating in the combinatorial exchanges are not bound
into the combinatorial neuronal assembly (modified and adopted from
Pulvermüller and Knoblauch (2009))
In addition to the wide cortical distribution of “seman-
tic areas” (Binder and Desai 2011; Pulvermüller 2013), a
most exciting aspect of semantic processing in the human
brain is that many brain lesions affect semantic categories
to different degrees, suggesting that brain areas specialize in
specific semantic content (Fig. 5, right panel, Shallice 1988;
Warrington and McCarthy 1987). Why should this be so?
Why is there, apparently, a semantic topography whereby
animal and tool words (such as “camel” and “hammer”)
draw on different temporal and frontal areas, action concepts
(“grasp”) engage the motor system, prepositions (“under”)
involve the inferior parietal lobe, sound words (“bell”) rely on
auditory cortices and even olfactory (“cinnamon”) and gus-
tatory words (“salt”) spark activation in piriform and anterior
insular cortex (Allport 1985; Pulvermüller 1999; Binder and
Desai 2011; Pulvermüller 2013)?
An explanation of semantic topography and category
specificity is possible in terms of correlation learning
mechanisms in association with corticocortical connectiv-
ity. Lesions in, and stimulation to, the motor system have a
causal effect specifically on the processing of action-related
words, because their word forms are linked by correlated
application to action schemas whose cortical mechanisms
include neuronal populations in the motor areas of the human
brain. The explanation assumes that, at least for some typ-
ical action words learned early on in childhood, word form
processing occurs in close temporal contingency with acti-
vation of a motor program realized as a circuit reaching into
motor areas. Therefore, a higher-order circuit develops by
way of associative correlation learning that unites the repre-
sentation of the word form and that of the motor program into
one higher-order DNA. At the cognitive level, higher-order
DNAs provide the cortical “representation” and the mecha-
nism for the processing meaningful words, that is, the word
form together with its semantics, which, in the case of an
action word, includes knowledge of the motor schemas the
word is typically used to speak about.13 This consideration
13 This does not apply to all action words in everybody. Words related
to actions not typically performed by humans (“barking”), to specialist
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motivates the use of the term “thought circuit” (TC) for this
type of DNA. Stimulation of the motor part of this thought cir-
cuit can subsequently influence the processing of the action-
related word, and removal of the motor part will reduce the
overall feedback in the circuit thus yielding a processing dis-
advantage (Neininger and Pulvermüller 2003; Pulvermüller
et al. 2010, 2005; Liuzzi et al. 2010; Willems et al. 2011;
Shebani and Pulvermüller 2013).
Similar points can be made for other semantic word types
(Pulvermüller 1999). Please remember, for example, the
above mentioned findings that, odor words such as “cin-
namon” activate in primary olfactory cortex and anterior
insula (González et al. 2006) and sound words such as “bell”
draw especially on auditory areas in superior temporal cortex,
where lesions affect the sound word category most severely
(Kiefer et al. 2008). The higher-order DNAs or TCs bound
together by long-distance corticocortical fibers include word
form circuits in perisylvian cortex, category-specific parts
of the semantic circuits reaching into modality-preferential
areas and connection hubs in frontal, parietal and inferior
temporal cortex interlinking the latter. It appears that the prin-
ciple of correlation learning helps to explain a good deal of
category specificity of concepts and aspects of the “semantic
topographies” of words that relate to specific types of con-
cepts (bottom panel of Fig. 5), along with the involvement of
general semantic hub-like convergence areas. It remains to
be seen whether alternative approaches can provide alterna-
tive explanations of category-specific semantic topographies
in the cortex.14
10 Why are humans special?: A cell assembly hypothesis
The cell assembly perspective leads to a range of novel
explanations of localizations of higher human brain func-
tions. We believe that such explanation represents a crucial
step in advancing cognitive neuroscience from a descriptive
(Keplerian) to an explanatory (Newtonian) science. In pre-
vious paragraphs, we discussed explanations of the local-
ization of specific cognitive functions, including memory,
decision, attention, language and concepts. Over and above
Footnote 13 continued
actions (“pole jumping”) in nonspecialists and to standard human
actions in persons with neurological motor deficits may primarily be
learned in a perceptual manner or from linguistic context. It is an excit-
ing topic of current research to investigate differences in action-based
and perceptually based semantics in such cases.
14 An approach to category specificity has been offered in terms of
conceptual mechanisms determined by the genetic code (Shapiro and
Caramazza 2003). This perspective can explain inborn category dis-
tinctions that provide a selection advantage in natural environments,
but fails to account for intercultural differences in category systems and
does not explain the placement of cortical loci each specific category
draws upon.
this so-called where-question (see, for example, Pulvermüller
1999), there are other types of explanations, many of which
are still missing in cognitive neuroscience. In the section on
language, we already touched upon the questions of combina-
torial generalization and vocabulary size. Nevertheless, even
after these elaborations, we still lack a full answer to many
questions about the sheer size of human cognitive repertoires:
Why do humans, but not other species, develop an exquis-
ite vocabulary of so many words? Likewise, why do humans
have an over-rich action repertoire at their hands, which their
nearest neighbors lack? How come that, apparently, humans
are able to make fine-grained conceptual distinctions that are
modified by learning and can even influence the individu-
als’ perception according to categorical boundaries imma-
nent to the concepts? These questions call for answers in
neuromechanistic terms. In the remaining paragraphs, we
will elaborate on one type of answer offered by cell assembly
theory.
Accounts in terms of multiple modular cognitive systems
offer the possibility to explain the abovementioned fine cog-
nitive capacities, which make humans special, as epiphenom-
ena of an exquisitely capable neural substrate that brings to
fruit the processing potential of each of its separate compos-
ite systems or cortical areas. The key may therefore be an as
yet not discovered feature of local neuroanatomical structure
and/or neurophysiological processing that makes the areas
of the human cortex special and allows each of the individ-
ual cognitive systems to work more efficiently. This approach
may still have difficulty explaining why these human features
might have arisen in one go, with apes and monkeys lacking
all the mentioned superb abilities, whereas all (unimpaired,
not deprived) humans apparently share them. Wouldn’t it be
more plausible that a single structural or functional feature
developed first in one area and then spread gradually across
others? In this case, one might expect intermediate forms,
for example a monkey with monkey-like conceptual distinc-
tions but huge vocabulary, but such intermediate forms do
not seem to exist.
A second approach might therefore be the emergence of
one specific brain area (or small set of brain areas) that is
special and provides humans with their specific higher abil-
ities. The multiple demand network, especially its prefrontal
part, is the prime candidate in such an account, where, by
hypothesis, the parts of complex mental programs are being
separated, organized and controlled (see also the section on
decisions, Duncan 2010). However, a multiple demand net-
work in prefrontal cortex does not explain the large vocabu-
laries in the action, perception and language domains. These
large vocabularies seem to depend on specific brain areas,
including perisylvian cortex and motor systems, which show
little overlap with the multiple demand system.
The cell assembly account suggests that the key to human
cognition lies in the connections between cognitive systems,
123
Biol Cybern (2014) 108:573–593 587























general and category-specific semantic circuits
Fig. 5 Semantic brain mechanisms. Top left panel: Areas of particular
importance for general semantic processing as proposed in the litera-
ture. iFC inferior frontal cortex, iPC inferior parietal cortex, sTC supe-
rior temporal cortex, m/iTC middle/inferior temporal cortex, aTC ante-
rior temporal cortex, TP temporal pole. Top right panel: Cortical areas
where semantic category specificity was reported in neuropsychological
patient studies and neuroimaging research—for word categories seman-
tically related to actions (for example, “grasp”), numbers (“seven”),
space (prepositions, e.g., “under”), sound (“bell”), color (“green”),
shape (“square”), animals (“cat”), tools (“knife”) and abstract entities
(“love”, “beauty”). Middle panel: Model of general lexico-semantic
circuits shared by all word types (leftmost graph) and category-specific
circuits for four different semantic word types (from left to right: face-
related, arm-related and leg-related action words, form-related word).
Bottom panel: Brain activation for the same types of words as revealed
by fMRI experiments and cluster analysis (adopted from Pulvermüller
2013)
in their structural linkage and functional interaction. Such
interlinkage would solve a key problem at the neurocomputa-
tional level, which arises whenever fine-grained distinctions
need to be implemented in neuronal networks. From a neuro-
mechanistic perspective, it is difficult to functionally separate
circuits that share much of their neuronal resources. If two
cell assemblies overlap to a large degree, they tend to merge
functionally (Palm 1990, 1993). If one is activated, activity
spreads over to the other and both together ignite. The best
way to avoid this problem is to build architectures in which
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circuits only overlap to a small degree. One cell assembly
may intersect with many others, but, in order to separate cir-
cuits functionally, each intersection should be small relative
to the size of each cell assembly (Palm 1990, 1993). The key
to human cognition may therefore lie in overlap reduction in
cortical circuits.
How is it possible to prevent large overlaps? In case of
the representation of very similar concepts—for example the
concepts of WISH and DESIRE—the overlap of semantic
features is huge.15 Most attributes that characterize one of the
entities are also characteristic of the other, although there are
few fine-grained differences, for example, a DESIRE can be
seen as especially strong and long lasting. In a neuronal the-
ory assuming correspondence between conceptual features
and neuronal elements, the brain representations of such sim-
ilar concepts would therefore overlap substantially. The cell
assemblies of similar concepts would thus share most of their
neurons, with only few neuronal elements specific to each
conceptual circuit. This situation is illustrated schematically
in the top panel of Fig. 6.
In order to functionally separate the concepts, the neuronal
circuits would need to become more distinct. In other words,
their intersection would need to become smaller relative to
each cell assembly’s overall size. Shrinking the overlap area
does not seem to be an option, especially as neuronal ele-
ments in the overlap area would be most strongly connected
with each other due to their frequent co-activations when
either of the concepts is being processed. It appears as the
best strategy to add distinct neuron sets to each of the con-
ceptual circuits.
Relative shrinking of the overlap area can be achieved by
enlarging the distinct parts of cell assemblies. One way of
implementing this is by adding specific neuronal elements to
each assembly by correlation learning. In the case of the con-
cepts WISH and DESIRE, which are very similar in terms of
semantic features, each of the conceptual circuits could be
linked arbitrarily to maximally dissimilar symbols or word
forms, whose neuronal circuits would therefore be maxi-
mally distinct. If the entirely different word forms “wish” and
“desire” are being connected with the concepts, the resultant
enlarged lexico-conceptual circuits would exhibit a reduced
degree of overlap. The middle panel in Fig. 6 illustrates
15 It has been argued that not only concrete concepts but abstract
ones too are “grounded” in perception and action. This means that
there is semantic knowledge about specific situations, action schemas
and their context and so forth, to which the concepts apply (Barsalou
and Wiemer-Hastings 2005). Consistent with this notion, neuroscience
research showed that the processing of abstract emotion-loaded con-
cepts such as WISH and DESIRE relates to brain activity in a range
of brain structures with known roles in action and emotion processing
(Moseley et al. 2012; Vigliocco et al. 2013). The mechanism of overlap
reduction, which we outline below, is assumed to apply across cortical












Fig. 6 Overlap reduction in distributed neuronal assemblies or thought
circuits (DNAs/TCs) as a mechanism for fine-grained cognitive discrim-
ination. The top panel illustrates the overlap and functional separation
problem for the concepts WISH and DESIRE, which are semantically
very similar so that their cell assemblies overlap substantially and there-
fore activate each other and are difficult to separate functionally. It is
unclear how a conceptual network can separate such conceptual circuits.
Middle panel: Overlap reduction can be achieved by binding each cir-
cuit with an entirely different circuit, by cross-modality transcortical
linking. Similar concept circuits are linked to dissimilar word form cir-
cuits; therefore, the neuronal overlap of the entire TCs is being reduced.
Bottom panel: The mechanisms work both ways, also the circuits of sim-
ilar word forms can be made more distinct by way of conceptual links.
Overlap reduction in DNAs/TCs provides a mechanism for fine-grained
conceptual, linguistic, perceptual and motor discrimination and may be
key to human cognition
this mechanism. By cross-system association of word forms
and concepts, and development of a higher-order semantic
circuit, the degree of overlap between the widely distrib-
uted DNA/TCs is reduced (from 66 to 33 % in the exam-
ple).
We submit that shrinking the overlap of cell assemblies
by adding distinct assembly parts is the key evolutionary
advance of the human brain. It may be the learned links
between concepts and words that enabled humans to make so
many and so fine-grained conceptual distinctions. The mech-
anism works both ways: also similar word forms, such as the
words “pick” and “kick”, whose cell assemblies may overlap
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to a great extent and may be more easily separated function-
ally if they are linked to entirely different concepts (see bot-
tom panel of Fig. 6). The mechanism is not limited to classic
conceptual-linguistic discrimination. The huge human motor
and action repertoire may be causally related to the possibility
to verbally distinguish numerous minimally different action
schemas. Even the abilities to perceptually distinguish colors,
spatial locations, tastes, emotions, etc. may be driven, in part,
by available linguistic tools. The overlap reduction by cross-
modality binding of information may account for several of
the features of specifically human cognitive processing dis-
cussed previously.
The suggestions that language drives cognition and per-
ception had previously been made by scholars that viewed
language structure as a driving force of cognitive and percep-
tual processes (von Humboldt 1836; Whorf 1956). Recent
evidence has, in part, supported a role of language in spatial
cognition, color perception and emotion processing (Regier
and Kay 2009; Majid et al. 2004; Gendron et al. 2012;
Winawer et al. 2007; Thierry et al. 2009). The cell assem-
bly model now provides a tentative explanation why this
may be so. As mentioned above, the overlap reduction idea
also implies the reverse mechanism, the easier discrimina-
tion of linguistic tools, for example speech sounds, when
they are used to make meaningful distinctions. Note that it is
well established that speech sounds regularly used to distin-
guish concepts (for example the vowels [i] and [y] in French)
are themselves easier to distinguish, whereas sound distinc-
tions that do not serve a linguistic role in one’s language
may not be perceived as well and elicit reduced acoustic-
phonological brain responses (Näätänen et al. 1997; Diaz et
al. 2008).
If shrinking cell assembly overlap by cross-modality
binding of information is critical for human cognition, a
range of further predictions results. Are there more power-
ful connections between the relevant brain systems (includ-
ing perisylvian, visual and motor areas) in humans com-
pared with their monkey relatives (for recent positive evi-
dence, see Rilling 2014)? Would learning a new color term
changes both behavioral color discrimination and the color-
elicited brain response? Is the learning of a new action
repertoire facilitated by concordant linguistic discrimina-
tion? Would lesions in the connection pathways between
language, action and perception systems reduce the ability
to perform minimally different actions and to make percep-
tual distinctions? And would it likewise impair the discrim-
ination of words? Further questions apply in the transla-
tional domain: Would the teaching and therapy of language,
action and perception in healthy people and neurologically
impaired individuals profit from taking advantage of cross-
modality information linkage? For example, one sugges-
tion has been that aphasia therapy works more efficiently
if the method applied takes into account the functional con-
nections between language and action systems documented
by neuroscience research (Berthier and Pulvermüller 2011).
Finally, would neurocomputational networks that intrinsi-
cally interlink language, perception and action information
through cross-modality links allow for more efficient mod-
eling of cognitive functions than conventional models sepa-
rating these systems functionally? Could these neurocompu-
tational systems advance robotics in leading to more human
like artifacts? A wealth of new research streams and trans-
lational perspectives is opened by the concept of distributed
neuronal assemblies functioning as thought circuits, whose
main advantage is to provide a mechanism for conceptual
differentiation by overlap reduction and multimodal bind-
ing.
11 Summary
Using Braitenberg’s brain-theoretical considerations about
cell assemblies and their embedding into cortical neu-
roanatomy and function as a starting point (Braitenberg
1978), we explain how the concept of a widely distrib-
uted neuronal assembly, DNA, or thought circuit, TC, can
model a range of cognitive processes. Crucially, this cell
assembly perspective offers an explanation why cognitive
brain processes are related to specific brain areas. Cortico-
cortical connection structure and the loci of correlated neu-
ronal activity during learning together explain the location
of the areas relevant for language and visuomotor process-
ing. The facts that higher cognitive processes of memorizing
actions or taking decisions are not attributable to motor or
sensory brain systems, but rather draw heavily on adjacent
multimodal cortex, are explained by corticocortical connec-
tion structure, especially the high connectivity of these mul-
timodal sites with sensorimotor areas and the consequent
formation of DNA cores there. Category-specific meaning
processes in brain areas specialized for particular semantic
types are in part explained by correlation learning of word
form and concordant modality-specific semantic informa-
tion. Thus, instead of being restricted to a report of brain–
cognition correlates, the concept of a widely distributed cell
assembly interlinking information types, or DNA/TC, opens
perspectives on explaining why mental processes map on
their respective cortical areas. Over and above localization
questions, the DNA/TC approach addresses functional ques-
tions, why attention to unknown materials is more important
for their processing than for familiar signs such as a high-
frequency word or one’s own name. DNAs also provide a
mechanism for combinatorial generalization and for seman-
tically linking words and concepts (or thoughts). Spelled out
in terms of DNA/TCs, what makes humans special is the abil-
ity to interlink information between distant brain areas and
thereby shrink the overlap between representations. Over-
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lap reductions may be a key prerequisite for the emergence
of huge vocabularies, action repertoires and conceptual sys-
tems.
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